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1
Introduction

Three motives inspired the Spanish Crown’s exploration and colonization of Latin
America: to spread Catholicism, to find wealth, mainly in the form of precious metals, and to
expand the recently established Spanish empire. Exploitation and inequality were key
characteristics of Spanish colonialism; the military personnel, noblemen, bureaucrats, and priests
who constituted the four main groups of colonizers in Latin America carried with them a sense of
entitlement and divine right fueled by Spain’s victory in the Reconquista against the Moors and
an aversion to hard labor instilled by Spanish traditions of accumulating wealth and power
through relationship-building and receiving privileges from the Crown rather than by performing
work. Four main facets characterized Spanish colonialism and contributed to the persistence of
inequality and exploitation in colonial institutions – conversion, easy money, centralism, and
political violence. The facets of conversion, easy money, centralism, and political violence are
not institutions in themselves, but rather practices and logics of Spanish colonialism whose
presence can be seen in social, political, and economic institutions and traced throughout history
despite changes and developments in institutions. These facets’ entrenched presence in the
foundations of Latin American social, political, and economic institutions has manifested
throughout the shared and unique histories of Latin American countries. The facets’ lingering
impacts and logics can be traced in key shared events in Latin American countries’ histories,
namely the Independence Wars in the 1800s, the latifundia land ownership system, and the debt
crisis in the 1980s. Additionally, the facets are visible in the notorious Dirty Wars in Chile and
Argentina, periods of terror and abuse perpetrated by the militarized state.
It is important to clarify what area I mean when I refer to Latin America throughout this
paper. Spain’s territories in the Americas stretched from present-day Western United States,
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through Mexico and Central America, and across the Western half of South America. Latin
America can be understood in different ways, but I use it to describe the territory encompassed
by what is present-day Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile,
and Argentina. This characterization of Latin America makes for a more detailed depiction of
Spanish colonialism in those specific areas; it would be incorrect to generalize Spanish
colonialism in the southern part of Latin America to Spanish colonialism in Central America
(except for in Mexico, which experienced colonialism very similarly to Latin America due to its
possession of the Aztec Empire), mostly because Spanish colonialism was more concentrated in,
and thus played a more significant role in the development of, South American countries of Latin
America. Southern Latin America was home to the Inca Empire, and previous research shows
that the Spaniards “tended to colonize most extensively precolonial regions that were populous
and highly developed,” for example territories of the Inca Empire in Southern Latin America and
of the Aztec Empire in Mexico.1 While maintaining this distinction of and focus on South
American Latin America, keep in mind that the same logics and practices of Spanish colonialism
were present throughout other Spanish colonial territories as well; my distinction simply helps to
narrow the scope of this project and provide a more detailed analysis and discussion of a smaller
area.
Spain’s colonization of Latin America was unique in its methods and the underlying
practices, motivations, and logics behind those methods, especially when compared to England’s
colonization of North America. English colonialism in North America occurred mostly at the
hands of commoners; the famous Puritan Pilgrims sought independence from the Church of
England and a new start away from a country which persecuted them for their religious beliefs.

Matthew Lange, James Mahoney, and Matthias vom Hau, “Colonialism and Development: A Comparative
Analysis of Spanish and British Colonies,” American Journal of Sociology 111, no. 5 (2006): 1412.
1
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Spanish colonialism was joint effort between the Crown and the Catholic Church that aimed to
further the power of both, while individuals religiously separated from their monarch and
country built the early English colonies in America. English colonists sailed to America to start a
new life with no intentions of returning to England, a motivation fundamentally opposed to
Spanish colonists’ motives, which were to spread Catholicism, extract wealth from the Americas,
and return to Spain with an elevated economic, and therefore social, status. These differences in
intentions are evidenced by the types of people sent to colonize the Americas. Early English
colonists were families, men and women, prepared to work to settle in a foreign land, yet
Spanish colonists consisted of priests, military men, bureaucrats, and noblemen expecting to
conquer and convert under the authorities of the Crown and the Church.
Differences between England’s and Spain’s approaches to colonizing the Americas
explain why liberal and capitalist institutions valuing private property and independence from
centralized rule became the building blocks of the United States but struggle to survive in Latin
America. English colonists’ desire to build something new and better for themselves and their
families opposed Spanish colonists’ preservation of Spanish political and economic power
structures from which they benefited. It is important to understand the uniqueness of Spanish
colonialism and not to generalize colonialism. Exploitation and inequality characterized all
colonialism, but colonialism occurred for numerous reasons and in differing ways in colonized
areas. Not recognizing the distinctions between colonized countries’ colonial experiences forms
incomplete pictures of the origins and developments of different manifestations of the shared
colonial logics of exploitation and inequality.
By looking at generalized and specific events in which Spanish colonial logics and
practices recur, we can gain a deeper understanding of why economic and political instability
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and inequality continue to plague many Latin American countries. My research’s identification
of how main facets of Spanish colonialism became rooted in Latin America additionally
facilitates a better comprehension of the reasons behind failed attempts to address residual
colonial logics of exploitation and inequality. Existing scholarship discusses the various aspects
of Spanish colonialism, commonly the encomienda system of labor and the role of the Catholic
Church. Some research also focuses on how poverty and exploitation in Latin America
originated in Latin America’s colonial period. However, none of these works trace specific facets
of Spanish colonialism from the Reconquista into foundational Latin American institutions and
then throughout shared events in Latin American history. Additionally, the Dirty Wars, while
thoroughly studied (Argentina’s more than Chile’s), have not previously been explored within
the proposed framework of the persistence of facets of Spanish colonialism.
This paper contains two main sections of analysis. The first part will provide a brief
historical narrative of the experiences in Spain’s history, most importantly the Reconquista, that
contributed to the formation of the conversion, easy money, centralism, and political violence
facets of Spanish colonialism. The facets are then explored in detail, establishing the theoretical
framework that will be applied in the paper’s second part, which describes generalized
manifestations of the facets in the independence wars, the development of the latifundio system,
and the 1980s debt crisis. The analysis concludes with a more specific investigation into the
manifestations of the facets in Chile’s and Argentina’s Dirty Wars.
Roots of Spanish Colonialism
Contrary to colonialism by England and France, Spain and Portugal approached the
colonization of Central and South America with strongly religious motives. The Iberian
Peninsula, in which Spain is located, has a rich and complicated religious history in which
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“Christianity had thrived, suffered, and recovered again and again.”2 Prior to Christopher
Columbus’ famous 1492 voyage of discovery to the Americas, Spain had only recently, in the
same year, conquered the last remaining Moorish stronghold in the Iberian Peninsula, the
Kingdom of Granada. The Reconquista, or Reconquest, was the almost 800-year war for
dominion of the Iberian Peninsula between Christian and Muslim forces. Religion, specifically
Catholicism, was a unifying point for the Christian forces, which consisted of the four Christian
monarchies of Castile, Aragon, Portugal, and Navarre. The marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon and
Isabella of Castile in 1426 joined the kingdoms of Aragon and Castile into Spain.
The mindset of ‘manifest destiny’ perceived by the Spanish monarchy in driving out the
Muslims and spreading Christianity permeated Spanish society even after Spain had gained
majority control of its territory in the 1200s. Ferdinand’s and Isabella’s final defeat of the
Muslims in Granada in 1492 signaled to Spaniards that “God extended his favor…a sentiment
that conquistadors soon carried to the Americas.”3 The Reconquista became a key part of Spain’s
self-image and personal historical narrative, and the role played by Catholicism and the Church
in the Reconquista embedded religious values into Spain’s social and political workings while
also increasing the Church’s political and economic power. Just as the “[l]ines between State and
Church, between public and private, were blurred” in 15th and 16th century Spain,4 so were those
lines blurred in colonial Latin America; many of the relationships and overlap between the
religious, political, and economic institutions established in Latin America during the colonial
period are rooted in the Reconquista. Also, the Reconquista spawned systems by which military
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John Frederick Schwaller, The History of the Catholic Church in Latin America: From Conquest to Revolution and
Beyond (New York: NYU Press, 2011), 13.
3
Mark A. Burkholder, Monica Rankin, and Lyman L. Johnson, Exploitation, Inequality, and Resistance: A History
of Latin America since Columbus, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 2.
4
Guillermo M. Yeatts, The Roots of Poverty in Latin America, trans. Gabriela Mrad (North Carolina: McFarland &
Company, Inc., Publishers, 2005), 20.
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success became a mechanism for upward social mobility, linking military efforts with economic
and social rewards so that the “predominant values and social rankings in Spanish society were
related to military power.”5 As it emerged from almost eight centuries of the religiously charged
Reconquista, Spain approached the colonization of Latin America with political, economic, and
social power structures that religiously legitimized and economically and socially incentivized
military violence and exploitation.
The strongly religious aspect of the Reconquista enabled the Catholic Church to
accumulate large amounts of social, political, and economic capital in Spain. After the 1200s, the
militarized religious zeal instilled by the Reconquista persisted and manifested in militaryreligious orders. Military-religious orders fulfilled two key functions in continuing to fight
conversion and territory battles in Spain. First, the orders added a military branch to Spanish
forces to help defeat the Muslims, and second, they provided “moral, physical, and spiritual
assistance,”6 thus strengthening the belief that the Reconquista and subsequent wars were
inherently tied to a religious, divinely-ordained purpose.
Often, the Spanish monarchy rewarded military-religious orders’ service with land grants
over which the Church exercised a high degree of autonomy, specifically through a set of unique
laws and privileges called fuero eclesiástico, a concept similar to that of clerical immunity.7
Since the 1100s, monarchs of the various kingdoms in the Iberian Peninsula awarded fueros to
specific towns or groups, often as a reward for military success or as an incentive for those towns
and groups to support the monarchs’ initiatives. Forging alliances with nobles was paramount to
the early Christian kingdoms’ success – “allegiance to family, birthplace, and residence
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outweighed attachments to larger administrative units, including kingdoms.”8 Fueros served as a
different set of laws, often allowing increased privileges and autonomy, by which a town or
group would be separately governed. Under fueros, nobility accustomed to prioritizing their
wants and needs above the Crown’s were incentivized to align their interests with the Crown’s
while maintaining high degrees of autonomy and privilege. Fueros often accompanied land
grants, called encomiendas, which reinforced the special privileges endowed under the fueros.
The owner of an encomienda was called an encomendero. Encomiendas “consisted of temporary
grants by the Crown of Castile conferring jurisdiction over territories recaptured from the Moors.
Speciﬁcally, the Crown ceded the right to collect a number of taxes payable by the inhabitants of
the territory subject to the encomienda.”9
Fuero eclesiástico gave Churches and Church officials and clergy, in gratitude for the
service of military-religious orders, an increased level of autonomy. It granted immunity from
royal courts, meaning that priests accused of a crime could opt to have their case heard in
ecclesiastical court, by their peers, instead of in royal or local court. This provided opportunity
for Church officials to act outside of and above the Spanish Crown. Additionally, Church
officials were often exempted from taxes; in cases where the Church owned land upon which
others lived, as a result of land grant rewards to military-religious orders, the Church officials
had the power to levy taxes from those residents. Excusal from paying taxes and the acquisition
of income from taxing the people, coupled with Church officials’ ability to operate outside of
common legal restraints, allowed the Church to accumulate wealth and land much more quickly
than most other groups in Spain.
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Military-religious orders built up the political and economic powers of the Catholic
Church and formalized a relationship between the Spanish crown and the Catholic Church, a
relationship which, when it reached its height, manifested in the conquest of Latin America. As
stated by Guillermo Yeatts, “The conquest of Latin America was essentially a public initiative in
which the unity of Church and State was at its highest point.”10 The societal importance
Spaniards placed upon the Catholic Church combined with the Church’s powerful set of assets
positioned it as a strong ally of the Spanish Crown. A papal grant of royal patronage granted
after Spain’s conquest of Granada allowed Queen Isabella to further intertwine the Church and
Crown by selecting individuals for high-level Church positions and pressuring mid- and lowlevel Church officials and clergy to undertake reforms.11
Military participation in the Reconquista provided opportunities for economic and social
advancement for individuals, too. The Christian kingdoms of Castile, Aragon, and Portugal
“were hereditary monarchies marked by social, economic, and legal inequality,”12 leaving little
room for upward social mobility or achievements outside of one’s inherited social rank.
Historian John Elliott emphasizes this lack of career options in Spanish society, writing, “The
nature of the economic system was such that one became a student or a monk, a beggar or a
bureaucrat. There was nothing else to be.”13 The monarchy headed Spanish society. Underneath
the monarchy resided few titled nobles, then untitled nobles, or hidalgos, followed by a majority
of commoners, including merchants, professionals, artisans, servants, farmers, and livestock
herdsmen, and lastly some African slaves.14 The Reconquista gave young men access to spoils of
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war and the possibility of land rewards from the Spanish Crown for their military successes, all
major components of achieving a higher social status. Wealth correlated with social status in
Spain, and war spoils, such as goods and slaves, combined with land grants from the Crown,
increased military men’s wealth and thus their social statuses.
The Reconquista heavily informed the Spanish monarchy’s conquest mindset and fueled
its exploration of the Americas. Numerous aspects of the Reconquista mindset and Spanish
monarchy were reflected in the social, religious, political, and military institutions of Latin
America throughout the region’s history. Examining the roots and evolution of these systems
helps to explain why Latin America has historically experienced political turmoil, economic
instability, and outbreaks of state-sponsored violence.
Key Facets of Spanish Colonialism
Spain’s colonization of Latin America involved complex interactions between multiple
actors with varying ideologies and motivations. While there are many features of Spanish
colonialism, I identified four main facets – conversion, easy money, centralism, and political
violence. These four facets interplayed throughout the colonization and development of Latin
America, but each distinctly influenced the institutional and social history of Latin America. The
conversion, easy money, centralism, and political violence aspects of Spain’s colonization of
Latin America trace back to Spanish society, and the evolution of the ideologies and institutions
tied to those four facets demonstrate just how relevant the effects of colonialism remain. While
each facet’s expression changed significantly throughout Latin American history since
colonialism, they are intrinsically present and identifiable in key logics, ideologies, and
institutional functions at all stages of Latin America’s development. This section describes the
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facets of conversion, easy money, centralism, and political violence, providing context for the
next section, which illustrates how the four facets have manifested in Argentina and Chile.
To understand the religious, social, political, and economic origins of Latin America, it is
also important to look at who built Spanish America. The four groups that constituted the
majority of Spanish settlers were military men, noblemen, priests, and bureaucrats who served
the Spanish Crown.15, 16 All of these groups benefited from the conversion, easy money,
centralism, and political violence facets of Spanish colonialism, and as the founders of Spanish
America, they possessed the power to ensure that those facets and the inequality of the
institutions and systems associated with them would prevail in Latin America just as they did in
Spain. Remembering that these four groups founded the early economic, political, religious, and
social institutions, both formal and informal, helps to show how strongly the four facets of
conversion, easy money, centralism, and political violence influenced the foundation and growth
of Latin America.
A Brief Discussion of Race and the Facets
While not a focus of this research, it is important to acknowledge the role of race in
Spanish colonialism and Latin American countries’ developments. Race and its part in
determining economic and social statuses in Spanish colonies generally followed the trend of the
whiter you are, the wealthier you are, but it was also more complex. Early manifestations of
racism in Spain were obvious in the Spaniards’ exploitative and abusive enslavement and
approaches to conversion of indigenous peoples. Because of the perceived God-given sanction of
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Yeatts, The Roots of Poverty in Latin America, 69.
Schwaller, The History of the Catholic Church in Latin America, 38.
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their colonial mission and their acceptance of “the inevitability of human inequality,”17 Spanish
colonizers claimed a superior moral status to the natives. Charles Mills explains the resulting
impacts of this logic on the evolution of racism in colonial societies:
The establishment of society thus implies the denial that a society already existed; the
creation of society requires the intervention of white men, who are thereby positioned as
already sociopolitical beings. White men who are (definitionally) already part of society
encounter nonwhites who are not, who are ‘savage’…These the white men bring partially
into society as subordinate citizens or exclude on reservations or deny the existence of or
exterminate. In the colonial case, admittedly preexisting but (for one reason or another)
deficient societies (decadent, stagnant, corrupt) are taken over and run for the ‘benefit’ of
the nonwhite natives, who are deemed childlike, incapable of self-rule and handling their
own affairs, and thus appropriately wards of the state.18
As Spanish colonies developed and grew into more established societies, and the population of
mixed-race children grew, original white-nonwhite distinctions and hierarchies had to evolve.
“Not biology, but wealth, lineage, occupation, and power or, alternatively, poverty and tributary
status largely defined race. Yet culture, the mastery of Spanish or Portuguese, Christianity, mode
of dress, diet, place of residence, and honor also contributed to racial and ethnic identity.”19
Therefore, although “white elites continued to pride themselves on ‘pure’ lineage as the basis for
being ‘Spaniards’, mixed-race children were not automatically excluded from wealthier social
circles simply because of their race, but rather were afforded privilege if they had money and
could demonstrate a successful adoption of Spanish civilized culture and European whiteness.20
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The facets of conversion, easy money, centralism, and political violence acted to perpetuate
systems of inequality that favored Spanish colonizers, who were white, and thus can also be
connected to the evolving role of race and racism in Latin America. However, further
investigation into that connection does not belong to this project and would be a course of future
research.
Conversion
Christianity post-Reconquista in Spain provided the dominant lens through which Spain
conquered and settled the Americas. Evangelizing to the heathen indigenous peoples served as
one of the main motivators for the exploration and exploitation of the Americas; spreading
Christianity was a key piece of Queen Isabella’s and King Ferdinand’s conditions for funding
Columbus’ famous 1492 voyage.21 As the key implementors of conversion, priests consistently
sailed with the military personnel, nobles, and bureaucrats to Latin America. The religious
charge of the Reconquista generated two main sentiments, both of which contributed to the
conversion facet of Spain’s colonization of Latin America. These components of Spain’s
conversion mentality included the beliefs that Spain’s mission in Latin America was Godordained and that maintaining religious homogeneity was in the best interest of Spain’s security
and would aid in Spain’s mission to expand its empire. Spain’s approach to conversion in Latin
America exemplifies how Spain deemed itself superior to the indigenous peoples of Latin
America, especially to non-Christians, as a result from its victory in the Reconquista.
First, Spain’s victory against the Muslims infused Spaniards with a sense of divine
mission to conquer and convert nonbelievers. To the Crown, its victory symbolized an extension
of God’s favor to Spain. Conquering a new land in the name of God while simultaneously
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spreading Christianity seemed a natural continuation of the divinely sanctioned work of the
Reconquista and provided Spain with another opportunity to gain more favor with God.22 Thus,
conversion became a key piece of Spain’s mission in Latin America. Spanish Christians’
perception of God’s favor also contributed to a sense of superiority over other countries and
groups, especially non-Christians, and began the distinction between civilized, Christian
countries and barbaric, heathen countries. The process of ‘civilizing’ indigenous peoples, a
common thread in imperial colonial rhetoric, was inherently tied to converting them. Connecting
the processes of civilizing and converting legitimized Spain’s use of force and violence as means
of saving indigenous peoples.
Second, the Reconquista gave rise to an absolute belief that Catholicism was the only
religion and that religiously homogenizing Spain would promote security. Linked to Spain’s
belief in its divine mission to conquer and convert, the Reconquista also endowed Spanish
Christians with the certainty that their religion was the one and only right religion. This belief
fueled intolerance of and lack of respect for other religions, furthering Spain’s zeal to convert the
non-Christian native peoples in Latin America. The Spanish monarchs also pursued religious
uniformity to stabilize and unite the Spanish empire in order to more smoothly expand the
Spanish empire. The Crown believed that a religiously united Spanish empire would promote
national security and stability by decreasing the likelihood of another religious war like the
Reconquista. Conversion signaled a finality to physical conquest. However, postcolonial and
geography theorist David Slater points out that “any discussion of threats to order and stability
must be linked to discourses of identity and difference. What exactly is being threatened? What
are the discourses or regimes of truth that are immanent in the power relations that seek to
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preserve order?”23 In expanding an empire, “desire for territorial expansion in conjoined with an
imperialist sameness for order where any notion of ‘mixture’ or ‘blot’ is not to be gladly
contemplated.”24 Through placing such immense importance on conversion, Spain founded
beliefs in Latin America around the importance of ideological purity and unity.
The Crown’s push for a purely Catholic Spain is exemplified not only by Spanish
colonialism but by the Spanish Inquisition, the Spanish Crown’s aggressive mission between
1476 and 1515 to eliminate false converts from Judaism, or conversos, in Spain. The Inquisition
provided the Spanish monarchy with a religious-political institution through which “they could
unite their disparate kingdoms, deflect political tensions onto the Jews, and make the Spanish
monarchy the vanguard of militant Christianity in Europe.”25 The Spanish Inquisition shows how
far the Spanish Crown was willing to go to ensure genuine conversion to Catholicism among all
in its empire, and it offers another example of the Reconquista’s effects on the Spanish
ideologies and institutions.
The conversion facet of Spain’s colonization of Latin America demonstrates how Spain
claimed a moral high ground and assumed a superior position in relation to Latin America. It
epitomizes the traditional narrative of colonialism: a colonizing power imposes its own superior
ideologies upon another group through framing its intervention as necessary in saving the
colonized from itself. Slater explains this occurrence by identifying three formative elements of
an imperial power:
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First there is an enduring invasiveness or desire and capacity to penetrate other societies
and cultures, where the penetration is multi-dimensional and affects the psychological,
political, economic, financial and cultural realms in an intersecting manner. This element
is part and parcel of the will to impose on the other a set of values, imaginations and
practices, which are deemed to be superior – to ostensibly save the other from itself, to
impose an external identity onto a recipient society or culture which is represented as in
need of progress, or order, or civilization, or improvement, or reform or democracy, thus
denying the other society its right to make its own destiny…these imposing
representations are crucially imbricated with the legitimization of interventions…This
second element is then inseparably entwined with the third, which is constituted by the
lack of respect for the other, being manifested in subordinating modes of representation,
of negative essentializations which erase or belittle the complexities, differences, and
heterogeneities and intrinsic value of the other culture or society.26
The conversion facet of Spanish colonialism aligns with the three elements outlined by Slater.
Utilizing conversion, Spain legitimized the three main parts of imperialism: first, its desire to
invade and change existing native societies; second, its imposition of its religious and political
ideologies upon indigenous peoples; and, third, as shown by its physical and ideological invasion
into indigenous societies and by its exploitation of indigenous peoples and resources, its inherent
lack of respect for and denial of the value of non-Spanish, non-Christian peoples.
Easy Money
Another main facet of Spanish colonialism was Spain’s inclination towards easy money.
While the term ‘easy money’ can often refer to an economic stimulus policy in which interest
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rates are low, I use it to describe the process of obtaining money through little work. Two
important concepts contributed to Spain’s easy money attitude – rent-seeking behavior and a
booty mentality. Spain’s rent-seeking politics and the residual booty mentality from the
Reconquista accustomed Spain to making easy fixes in its economy, exploiting resources and
people in Latin America for short-term gains while discouraging entrepreneurial economic
activity that would have resulted in long-term economic success and stability both in Spain and
in Latin America. Spain’s easy money mentality doomed economies in Latin America to
instability and low productivity, set a precedent for state interference in private property, and
incentivized exploitative behavior. All of the groups who colonized Latin America benefited
from the exploitative and privilege-based nature of rent-seeking behavior, and military personnel
especially profited off the booty mentality instilled by the Reconquista.
Although Spain benefited financially and politically from the Reconquista, the Spanish
Crown needed more funding to advance its empire and hoped that expansion into the New World
would provide financial benefits. Even if Columbus’ initial voyage failed, financial losses to the
Crown would be small, and the additional opportunity to spread Catholicism and Spain’s glory
swayed King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella to fund Columbus when no other European monarch
would.27 The Spanish government traditionally relied on taxing its people as one of its main
sources of revenue, exemplifying its roots in rent-seeking behavior. “Rent-seeking is a socially
unproductive behavior in which in the short term one player wins, and the other one loses, but in
the long term, everybody loses.”28 Because of the Crown’s tendency to award fueros, which
often included tax exemptions or even the ability to tax others, to wealthier nobles, the
commoners “who comprised more than 90 percent of Iberia’s population” suffered the most from
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taxes.29 In the short-term, taxation of commoners and tax exemption of nobles provided the
Crown with income to fund its affairs while allowing it to retain the support of the nobility;
however, in the long-term, it created an unsustainable economic structure that resulted in
financial problems and inequality among Spaniards. When it conquered Latin America, Spain
brought this type of rent-seeking behavior with it.
Rent-seeking fundamentally opposes profit-seeking behavior. Profit-seeking
encompasses “that entrepreneurial behavior that obtains profits as a result of competition in an
open market and by virtue of offering a better product at a lower price”; in rent-seeking,
“benefits do not derive from meeting a need in a competitive context, but from a legal obstacle to
competition, an artificial monopoly, a special permit, etc.”30 In Latin America, as in Spain, “rentseeking activities were rewarded. It became more profitable to invest time and effort in
influencing government officials to obtain privileges or protections than to go the difficult road
of satisfying the consumer in an open market.”31 The economic institutions and arrangements in
Spain, such as fueros, incentivized individuals to obtain privileges to make money-making easier
rather than participate in risk-taking, entrepreneurial, competitive economic behavior. A major
example of rent-seeking behavior in post-Reconquista Spain is the encomienda system, the
Spanish Crown’s practice of rewarding military service in the Reconquista with land grants often
covered by fueros. Through participation in military-religious orders, men sought governmentawarded privileges to further their social and economic positions, embodying Yeatt’s description
of rent-seeking as a behavior rooted in obtaining benefits through special privileges.
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The encomienda system in Spanish America made Spain’s rent-seeking tendencies even
more obvious. In order to maintain as much control overseas as possible while still collecting
rents from Spanish colonists and native peoples, the Crown imposed inheritance, trade, and
relocation restrictions on the encomiendas.32 These restrictions offered additional incentive for
encomenderos to obtain the maximum immediately available profit from the lands and
indigenous peoples they governed rather than try to create more wealth. Since the Crown made
encomiendas uninheritable, encomenderos did not have a reason to develop the encomienda for
longevity because they could not pass it on. Trade restrictions forbade the sale or rent of natives,
thus preventing encomenderos from optimally adjusting the size of their labor force, and
relocation restrictions prohibited encomenderos from moving their indigenous labor force to
more productive locations.33 The encomienda system in colonial Latin America was deliberately
designed by the Crown as a rent-seeking institution; in order to preserve its absolute power, the
Crown sacrificed the longevity and institutional integrity of the encomiendas through the
restrictions it enforced on them. Another relevant observation of the rent-seeking characteristics
of the encomienda system is how it tied revenue to the indigenous population, the labor force of
the encomiendas. Under the unsustainable conditions of the encomiendas, encomendero’s profits
declined with their indigenous labor force, eventually necessitating the import of African slaves
to some parts of Latin America in order to maintain the profit demanded by the Crown.34
Yet another example of Spain’s rent-seeking behavior is the mesta. The mesta “was an
institution by which exclusive grazing rights were granted by the king of Spain to the guild of
sheepmen; these rights interfered with the private properties of third parties who use the land for
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growing crops.”35 By designating land that could have otherwise been used for agriculture to
grazing purposes, the Crown disturbed agricultural activity in a primarily agrarian society while
also destabilizing the principle of private property. This “encouraged the bourgeoisie to flock
into the lower nobility and abandon productive enterprise; the loss of their commercial and
manufacturing skills and the indivisibility of their land entails would ensure that Spain remained
locked into a high rent-seeking equilibrium.”36 The mesta demonstrates the Spanish Crown’s
habit of weakening the middle class’ property rights and is one example of the unsustainable
institutions and behavior that Spain carried over and built into Latin America. Private property is
essential to the long-term success of the state; Aristotle claimed that private property is a
precondition for happy and well-ordered states.37 Furthermore, economic studies consistently
link strong protection of property rights to better economic outputs.38 The Spanish Crown’s
consistent interference in and disruption of private property destabilized its economy in the long
run and trapped it in a cycle of destructive rent-seeking behavior very comparable to the
economic instabilities and turmoil experienced in most Latin American countries.
The Reconquista created a booty mentality in Spain which the conquistadors carried with
them to Latin America. Almost 800 years of taking conquered Muslims’ belongings, land, and
slaves provided Spaniards with a way of accumulating wealth without having to invest in it or
work for it to grow. Rent-seeking and the post-Reconquista booty mentality accustomed Spain
“to seek additional resources following a path of least resistance,”39 instilling an easy money
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attitude in the conquistadors, which they brought to Latin America. The encomiendas and fueros
also enabled the beneficiaries of such institutions to prey off the labor of the lower classes by
collecting their taxes and controlling the products of their labor. Spanish settlers could have
grown crops and raised livestock themselves, but they lacked interest in doing so because they
could have done those things in Spain. “Rather, they craved provisions and gold and insisted that
the natives provide both.”40 Spain’s draw to easy money was accompanied with a growing
aversion to performing hard labor among the conquistadors, a sentiment that was supported by
the tendency of the nobles and military personnel in Spain to take advantage of the lower classes
under fueros and encomiendas. This aversion to hard labor and attraction to easy money becomes
particularly obvious in the exploitative behavior Spanish conquistadors participated in in colonial
Latin America.
Centralism
The third main facet of Spanish colonialism is centralism. The Spanish monarchy
exhibited many characteristics of a centralism, “a system of government in which political
authority is concentrated under a strong government.”41 The Spanish monarchs exercised large
amounts of concentrated authority over their territory, despite ceding some taxation and legal
rights to nobles and clergy through fueros and encomiendas, a position that Yeatts labels
“monarchic absolutism.”42 The Spanish monarchy’s power is evident in the immense reforms
Queen Isabella instituted in the Catholic Church following the Reconquista. Centralism also
played a fundamental role in the economic and political organizations of Spanish settlements in
Latin America, and its influence is closely tied with that of the conversion and easy money
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facets. As stated by Yeatts, the “centralized monarchy and bureaucracy of Castile defined the
institutional evolution of both Spain and Spanish America.”43 Since nobles, bureaucrats, and
priests composed three of the four main groups of Spanish colonists, they ensured that the
centralist Spanish systems they benefited from would also exist in Spanish America. The
centralism rooted in Latin America by Spanish colonialism established unequal power
distribution systems that favored the executive branch and the wealthy, setting up future prodemocracy efforts in Latin America to fail.
Centralism in Spain developed in part from Catholicism. Spanish monarchs derived their
power directly from God, without intermediaries, and the “divine right of kings” began to set a
precedent of monarchs protecting state sovereignty, often at the expense of individual rights.44
The king and the state became synonymous, and both “took on a sacred character.”45 Echoing the
major Catholic principle of an ultimately blind faith and trust in God, “giving support to rulers
was an article of faith.”46 Catholicism helped legitimize the Crown’s monopolization of
economic and political institutions while also fostering hope among the people that their leaders,
whose power was God-given, would be good and fair. This hope and willingness to put faith in
new leaders are common in Latin America’s history.
Very few checks existed on the executive powers of the Spanish monarchy during the
years of Spanish colonialism in Latin America. The monarchs controlled most elements of
Spanish society, including the economy. In Spain and Spanish America, “[a]ll the details of the
economy and the polity were carefully structured to promote the interest of the Crown.”47 All of
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the previously mentioned institutions demonstrate this. Through the fueros and encomiendas, the
Crown incentivized cooperation with its agenda and grew its military strength. The mesta shows
the Crown’s willingness to infringe on private property rights in order to maximize its profits. In
the Inquisition, the Spanish monarchs wielded the association between Church and state as a
weapon to promote religious homogeneity to unite and strengthen the Spanish Empire. The
Catholic Church’s position in Spanish society also benefited the Crown’s exploration into Latin
America. Spanish and Latin American laws and institutions were geared towards furthering the
Crown’s strength, and later the caudillos’ and inherited oligarchies’ strength; this situation made
it easier for the lower and middle classes, who represented the majority of the population, to
make and keep money if they worked outside of the law. Centralism dictated that Latin
America’s legal, political, and economic institutions were founded with the purpose of finding
easy money and then funneling those profits to people who already possessed military or
political power.
The Crown’s control of the encomienda system in colonial Latin America also shows
how deeply the Crown valued its centralized power. Financial professor Timothy Yeager points
out that the encomienda served as a “constrained wealth-maximizing outcome” because it
provided a lower income to the Crown than would other forms of labor, such as slavery.48 The
inheritance, trade, and relocation restrictions imposed on the encomiendas were deliberately
designed by the Crown to further its own interests, supporting Yeatts’ claim that “the details of
the economy and the polity were carefully structured to promote the interest of the Crown.”49
Despite the short-term nature and lower revenue of the encomienda system, the Crown preferred
the encomienda system of labor because it afforded the Crown a more secure position of rule in
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Latin America. Finally, the Crown reserved the right to confiscate encomiendas, a right it more
often invoked against the largest encomiendas in order to weaken the wealthiest encomenderos,
further exhibiting the Crown’s prioritization of securing its centralized power over wealth
creation in Latin America.50 Yeager writes, “[t]he Crown guarded its security at the expense of
creating a poor institutional framework for productivity and investment.”51
The Crown carefully orchestrated its role in Spain’s advancement into Latin America. In
order to keep financial risk to the Crown minimal, most expeditions to Latin America were
privately funded. However, the Crown retained the sole right to authorize expeditions through a
contract called the capitulacion. The capitulacion granted the expedition’s leader “the exclusive
right to conquer a particular territory, speciﬁed the concessions in the newly conquered territories
that could be assigned as rewards to the participants, and enunciated the rights reserved for the
Crown.”52 These expedition leaders are referred to by different names, including caudillos and
adelantados. Whatever success the leader found, the Crown usually received twenty percent of
the profits; this arrangement became known as the “Royal Fifth.”53 The Crown’s heavy
involvement in dictating the terms of exploration and colonization contributed to conquistadors’
aversion to hard labor since, rather than seeing the Crown take twenty percent of the profit of
one’s personal labor, taking advantage of indigenous peoples’ labor turned the best immediate
profit. Combined with the Reconquista-rooted easy money mentality, the Crown’s domination of
the colonization of Latin America offered little incentive for conquistadors to not exploit
indigenous peoples for labor.
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Centralist governments constituted the first governments in Latin America, demonstrating
the influence of Spanish centralism in Latin America. While not monarchies, these early
governments operated under similar principles. Yeatts describes the early governments in Latin
America:
Early on, those who exercised power in America were in fact the adelantados, who had
been granted concessions by the Crown to explore new lands and claim them in the name
of the king…An adelantado had the triple role of governor enforcing the laws of Spain
and its public administration; captain general leading the expedition troops; and chief
justice, because he heard judicial matters.54
After establishing a city, the adelantado and sometimes other authorities would pick officers for
the cabildo or ayuntamiento, “the basic unit of political, judicial, economic, and social
administration.”55 Officers were originally elected or appointed, but by the mid-1500s, under
Philip II, the positions went up for sale in order to fund the financially struggling Crown. Offices
were considered property, and as such they became inheritable or transferrable through
marriage.56 This facilitated the emergence of municipal oligarchies; the wealthiest in town
bought out political offices, and, as in Spain, wealth became tied to political power and special
economic, social, and legal privileges.
While not a characteristic unique to centralist governments, social status played an
important role in Spanish and Spanish American centralism. Similar to noblemen in Spain,
noblemen in Latin America used their titles for social, political, and economic power. The
Spanish “accepted the inevitability of human inequality, supported hierarchy, and lacked any
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enthusiasm for promoting social mobility. They sought privileges rather than equality, believing
that a properly ordered society concentrated power, wealth, and status in legally privileged
groups at the top.”57 This lack of motivation to change the inequitable status quo was built into
Spanish society, and since four main groups that came to Latin America (military men,
noblemen, priests, and bureaucrats) mostly benefited from the Spanish social system, they, too,
lacked incentive to change the role of social status in Spanish America, choosing instead to
model colonial Latin America after the centralist Spain they had just left. Like in Spain, most of
Latin America’s populated consisted of the rural and urban poor, who “lived lives constrained by
material deprivation and violence” as they worked to turn a profit for wealthy encomenderos
and, ultimately, the Spanish Crown.58
Political Violence
The final main facet of Spanish colonialism was political violence. Spain exited the
Reconquista as a highly militarized society, and the Spanish Crown used the military to further
its own political interests. Having won the Reconquista, the military was seen as a doer of God’s
will and a physical embodiment of the strength of Catholic Spain. Military service provided one
of the few routes of escaping one’s inherited social rank, making it a lucrative career. Young
men especially seized the opportunities for economic and social advancement that serving in
Spain’s military presented: military success was “rewarded with land and feudal power, and
therefore, those with military might became nobility.”59 Since conquering the New World was
identified as a continuation of the work of the Reconquista, military men took the opportunity to
continue accumulating wealth and status. Recall that military men constituted one of the four
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main groups of early settlers in Latin America. Latin America was forcefully conquered by
military personnel from a country that prioritized military strength and rewarded military
violence, and this deeply embedded violence into Latin America’s economic and political
culture.
Spain’s militarization stemmed from the Reconquista. Almost 800 years of war with the
Muslims had awarded military might immense value to Iberian kingdoms and also intertwined it
with the promotion of Christianity. In Spain, it became common practice to reward military
success with land grants, known as encomiendas, often accompanied by legal and taxation
privileges under sets of laws called fueros. Military-religious orders formalized the association
between the military and the Church. Spain’s victory in the Reconquista solidified the Crown’s
religious justification for military violence, and the encomienda and fuero systems incentivized
perpetration of military violence as a means to advance one’s previously unchangeable social
standing.
Spain, contrary to some of its religion’s teachings, legitimized military violence by
emphasizing other Catholic principles of obedience, humility, and service: “they accepted…and
tolerated…wars and military service as acts of obedience and conservatism…And the Christian
lower classes, with very few exceptions, followed their religious leaders’ viewpoint, humbly
acknowledged the power of the earthly authorities as legitimate and often found a military career
desirable.”60 By tying the military and religion together, the Spanish Crown strengthened the
powers of both institutions, the military and the Catholic Church, and legitimized its use of
violence towards its political ends; the military could perpetrate violence as part of its holy right,
and the Church could use military might to spread its teachings, but both ultimately served the
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agenda of the Crown. The Reconquista strengthened Spanish society’s perception of the military
as the means by which Spain would become one of the greatest empires in the world. If victory
against the Moors symbolized an extension of God’s favor, then the military symbolized an
agent of God’s will. Demonstrating the high importance of the military, the Spanish Crown
consistently directed a large portion of its income towards funding the military because the
military would lead Spain’s effort to build its empire.61
Although much of the violence experienced during Latin America’s colonization was
perpetrated by military personnel, or at least military-like personnel, political violence during
Latin America’s colonial period was also tied to religion. This is seen in the implementation of
the Spanish Inquisition in Spanish America during the first half of the sixteenth century. With
two headquarters, one in Mexico and one in Peru, the Seville Holy Office’s jurisdiction was
extended to Spanish America.62 Inquisition trials commonly employed violent strategies for
inducing confessions and prescribed violent punishments to those convicted: “Bigamy,
blasphemy, and other transgressions against public morality became the tribunal’s primary
concerns. The principal sentences for such offenses included fines, flogging, confiscation of
property, gagging, exile, and service in the galleys.”63
In search of East Asia, Columbus’ first voyage landed on the island of Hispaniola, also
known as Española, which today consists of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. In accordance
with the traditional Spanish reward system, Columbus granted encomiendas to leading officers.
While most accounts agree that Columbus’ initial contact with the natives was diplomatic and
peaceful, native resistance to the Spaniards’ demands for precious metals and food caused
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“armed force and physical abuse” to displace the “initial cordiality.”64 The Spanish arrivals were
quick to use violence to subdue any further native resistance, and survivors were enslaved under
the new encomenderos. 65 Within five years of Columbus’ arrival at Hispaniola, at least one third
of the native population died. Estimates of the native Taíno population prior to Columbus’
arrival vary greatly from 60,000 to 14 million, but in 1512, twenty years after the initial landing,
20,000 Taíno people remained in Hispaniola.66, 67 While much of the population decline is
attributed to disease, it is widely alleged and documented that Spanish abuse of and violence
toward native peoples contributed to the death toll.68
This pattern of conquest and enslavement of indigenous populations was repeated
throughout Spanish America by most conquistadors and encomenderos. Indigenous populations
labored to produce crops, raise livestock, and mine gold and silver, and encomenderos often
“employed violent practices to hasten the yield.”69 Although the Spanish Crown made attempts
in the 1500s to control the encomienda system, both to curb the native mortality rates associated
with it and to prevent the creation of a too-powerful nobility, the encomiendas had already
become institutionalized in Latin America.70 In fact, the three main restrictions on inheritability,
trade, and relocation worsened conditions. The “inheritance restrictions provided encomenderos
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with incentives to destroy more quickly the human capital because any bequeath motive was
absent.”71 The privileges awarded to the military in Spain encouraged men to participate in the
colonization and conquest of Latin America, where their violence was rewarded with land and
indigenous labor through the encomiendas; since the encomiendas did not provide the
encomenderos with the versatile and long-term wealth they had hoped for, working the land and
natives for all that they were worth provided the easiest and most profitable option. Additionally,
there was always the looming threat that the Crown could confiscate one’s encomienda. Violence
provided a familiar means by which encomenderos could maximize yields during the volatile
timespan of their rule. The encomienda system provides a telling example of how violence and
exploitation for social, economic, and political gains became entrenched in Latin American
society.
It is important to note that although the encomienda system in Spanish America was
mirrored after the encomienda system in Spain, the levels of violence and exploitation associated
with Spanish America’s encomiendas far exceeded the levels seen in Spain. Perhaps the great
distance between Latin America and any legal retribution in Spain caused conquistadors and
encomenderos to tend towards more unacceptable treatment of the natives. Conversion in
Spanish America, although one of Spain’s original main motivations for and goals of
colonialism, dropped to second place, behind the exploitation of natives in order to turn a
personal profit. The Crown’s dissatisfaction with the inhuman treatment of indigenous peoples is
evidenced by its attempts to legislate against abuses of natives. Some encomenderos and
conquistadors were arrested and jailed following investigations into their violence towards
indigenous peoples, but those consequences could not undo the harm caused to indigenous
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populations and cultures nor the institutionalized resort to violence that had already been
established in Latin America. Spain’s approach to colonizing Latin America established violence
as an element of political institutions, and violence not only represented a failure of those
institutions but also “a necessary component of their maintenance.”72
Intersections between the Four Facets
The four facets of conversion, easy money, centralism, and military violence
characterized Spain’s unique approach to colonizing Latin America. Through colonization, the
Crown aimed to spread Christianity, find wealth, and expand its empire. Spain’s recent victory
over the Muslims in the Reconquista heavily influenced the facets of Spanish colonialism, and,
while each facet uniquely contributed to the institutions and culture of colonial Latin America,
they played off of each other in ways that amplified their negative effects to create an
unprecedented social, political, and economic situation. Latin America was built on inequality
and exploitation, and all of the facets played a key role. The types of people who colonized Latin
America were not workers or laborers, and they embodied the facets and ensured that they were
firmly rooted into Spanish American society, enabling the facets to maintain their presence in the
social, political, and economic institutions of Latin America throughout its history.
Conversion and the Crown’s rent-seeking and booty mentalities helped the Crown justify
the exploitation of natives under the encomienda system, and the Crown’s deliberate crippling of
the encomiendas’ maximum productivity via restrictions incentivized violence and abuses
towards indigenous laborers. The Crown prioritized maintaining its centralized power over
encouraging wealth-creation in Spanish America, as evidenced by its choice to restrict
encomiendas, introducing the theme of abusive and coercive states, who often incentivized and
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used violence, into Latin America’s history.73 Latin America’s economic base was built on
gaining privileges through one’s social status rather than on competitive market principles,
disincentivizing entrepreneurial and wealth-creating activities. Latin America’s centralist roots
cultivated top-down as opposed to bottom-up political and economic systems. The wealthy
dominated the political and economic scenes, and military service offered one of the few ways to
escape one’s inherited status. With political, economic, and social institutions and traditions
skewed to favor those who already possessed the most wealth and power, Latin America was
inherently unable to effectively develop stable economic and political environments that
protected the majority of the population from abuses by the military and the government.
Combined with the influence of the conversion facet, political violence tied to religious purposes
planted seeds in Latin America of the importance of ideological purity and homogeneity, ideas
that would become very relevant during much of the political violence experienced throughout
Latin America. Ideologies and economic, social, and political power structures descended from
the facets manifest throughout Latin America’s history, exemplifying how deeply Spanish
colonialism permeates Latin America’s very foundations.
Spanish Colonialism’s Impacts on Latin America
This paper now moves from the previous theory section into an analysis of the
manifestations of the four main facets of Spanish colonialism throughout Latin America’s
history. While the social, political, and economic institutions of Latin American countries
differed and changed over time and between countries, I argue that the colonial logics and
practices of conversion, easy money, centralism, and political violence were present throughout
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those changes and differences. All prior Spanish territories experienced the facets of conversion,
easy money, centralism, and political violence. Despite not sharing the same exact colonial
histories, most Latin American countries’ histories reflect the same social, political, and
economic trends. To demonstrate that the four main facets were present in all countries’ unique
colonial experiences it is important to point out major shared experiences in Latin American
countries’ histories. After providing this generalized overview of key manifestations of the
impacts of Spanish colonialism on Latin America, I will then look at how the four facets are
discernable in the Dirty Wars in Argentina and Chile. This more country- and event-specific
focus shows how the logics of Spanish colonialism are traceable to similar ends in two Latin
American countries, despite marked differences in those countries’ colonial and postcolonial
histories.
Shared Impacts
The power of the Spanish empire began to decline following the Thirty Years’ War, a
war from 1618 to 1648 between Protestant and Catholic Europe which determined who the
leading European powers would be.74, 75 Spain and its fellow Hapsburg states and allies lost to
France, England, Bohemia and other anti-Hapsburg states. In 1763, Spain lost another war to
England, the Seven Years War. After reaching its lowest point after Napoleon’s invasion of
Spain in 1808, Spain lost most of its territories in the Americas within twenty years. Current
countries that were once Spanish colonies include Central America from Mexico to Panama, the
islands of Cuba and the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia,
Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina.
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Areas of Latin America experienced different specific colonial institutions, but
conversion, easy money, centralism, and political violence facets were present in the
development of all Latin American countries originally colonized by Spain. For instance, the
encomienda was not the only form of forced labor in colonial Latin America; colonizers’ and
encomenderos’ instituted types of labor based on the resources available on the land they were
granted. Chile and Peru possessed profitable mining lands, so natives were forced to work long
shifts in the mines under an institution known as the mita.76 Agricultural labor under the
traditional encomienda prevailed in Argentina, however. Both the mita and the encomienda
witnessed systemic violence toward native laborers and exhibited Spanish colonialism’s rentseeking tendencies. Conversion, too, underlaid colonization of all Spanish territories in Latin
America, but the severity and fervency varied across territories. Mexico, for example,
experienced the most rigorous Inquisition in Spanish America. Between 1536 and 1543, Mexico
City hosted nineteen Inquisition trials against natives, a number unparalleled elsewhere in Latin
America.77 Despite regional differences in specific colonization processes, individualized and
shared country experiences throughout Latin America’s history reveal Latin American countries’
shared Spanish colonial influences. Three of the most exemplary shared experiences were the
Independence Wars in the 1800s, the evolution of the encomienda system into latifundios, and
the debt crisis, or Latin America’s “lost decade,” of the 1980s.
The Independence Wars
Spain’s monopolization of Latin American trade fueled unrest in the colonies. For over
200 years, Latin America only had two authorized ports, in Veracruz, Mexico and Portobello,
Panama, both of which were governed by numerous customs inspections, and the colonies were
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strictly forbidden from trading with each other and with other nations; the Crown only allowed
the import of Spanish goods and the export of goods to Spain.78 Smuggling increased in response
to the restrictive policies. Through its trade monopoly, the Spanish Crown prioritized the
centralized wealth and power of the monarchy over the economic success of the colonies and
their inhabitants. Inspired by the success of revolutions in the United States and France during
the late eighteenth century, Latin American countries fought for their independence from Spain.
The independence wars of the 1800s encompassed the fights for initial independence from Spain
as well as conflicts between the countries as they tried to define their territories, formulate states,
and establish balance between each other. In 1816, Argentina declared its independence,
followed by Chile in 1818, and, within the next ten years, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru,
Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador also asserted their independence.79
The independence wars channeled two of the facets of Spanish colonialism – centralism
and military violence. “After the chaos of the independence wars, the republics underwent
periods of disorder and anarchy under authoritarian regimes that represented sui generis versions
of Iberian centralism.”80 The wars also reinforced the military success as one of the most
profitable ventures in Latin American society, echoing the status awarded to Spanish
conquistadors through the encomienda system, and assigned military forces a lasting role in
politics. The “military became a ready route for social advancement. Typically, after the war,
generals became landowners, wielding both social and political power.”81 Throughout the 1600s
and 1700s, the encomiendas in Latin America came to be called haciendas, so independence war
generals who received land became hacendados. The main difference between the social and
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political power of hacendados who had fought in the independence wars and the encomenderos
of the early colonial period was that hacendados’ power accumulation faced no restrictions since
now Spanish Crown existed to restrict their gains. Hacendados’ centralization of wealth and
power went unchecked, contributing to the oligarchical authoritarian regimes and the prevalence
of latifundios, large land concentration, experienced by many new Latin American countries.
Encomiendas into Latifundios
The differences that distinguish encomiendas, haciendas, and latifundios are somewhat
blurred. Encomienda usually refers to the more traditional colonial reiteration of the Spanish
encomienda system. As a reward for aiding in the conquest of Spanish America, an encomendero
received a land grant in Spanish America, which he governed and extracted wealth from via
indigenous forced labor. The encomienda system was marked by restrictions placed upon it by
the Spanish Crown to prevent a threatening accumulation of economic, political, and social
power among encomenderos. Haciendas operated similarly to encomiendas in that there was one
central ruler, an hacendado, who exerted almost unchecked power over their territory and
commonly free-wage laborers, binding them to the land by keeping them indebted.82 Following
the independence wars, military generals could receive haciendas, echoing the colonial military
reward system of the encomiendas. Haciendas could also develop “over years through numerous
small grants, purchases, bequests, and usurpations of native land.”83 However, unlike
encomenderos, hacendados were not limited by inheritance restrictions preventing them from
passing on their estate to their heirs nor were they hindered by the fear of government
confiscation of their estate. This allowed hacendados to accumulate wealth and power
unimpeded, something encomenderos could rarely do.
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Latifundios refer to “the large rural estates that long dominated the countryside
throughout much of Latin America.”84 This form of land concentration evolved throughout the
1800s and into the 1900s from the haciendas as hacendados accumulated more land and wealth.
Latifundios could also be purchased, almost exclusively by the wealthy, however. While the
price of land was low, “the administrative costs of submitting a petition [to buy the land] made
requesting title too expensive for much of the population.”85 With the wealthy dominating
possession of the land, the rural poor faced deteriorating conditions, “and poverty persisted in the
countryside…A few peasants farmed their own lands, but most worked on large estates as
latifundia expanded.”86 Latifundistas often used the land for raising cattle and avoided investing
in the land for agricultural purposes in order to minimize any financial risk and expenses. Chris
Carlson explains the effects that the latifundio had Latin American logics of production:
Right away, this form of land appropriation translated to a certain logic of production.
Cattle ranchers began converting arable land into pasture, causing small producers to
denounce the invasion of lands they had under cultivation. As early as the 1890s,
campesinos87 were complaining to state ofﬁcials that cattle ranchers were using land that
was ‘undoubtedly ﬁt for agriculture, not for grazing’…One ofﬁcial noted that many of
those who had acquired land were ‘only concern[ed] with exploiting the precious woods
that abound, ignoring their duty to use [the land] for agriculture or livestock’. This was a
direct result of the way in which the land had been appropriated, which put little pressure
on producers to maximize its productivity…Not only did [latifundistas] not acquire the
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land in a competitive market, but their ability to maintain possession of the land did not
depend on competition in the market – that is, they did not depend on competitive
production of the land in order to pay for it – and thus there was little pressuring them to
maximize the productivity of their holdings. Instead, landowners sought to minimize risk
by investing little in the land, and simply collecting rents from the cattle herds that
roamed their land, or from other extractable resources.88
The logic of underdevelopment and the lack of incentive to maximize the land’s productivity in
order to avoid investing large expenses and undertaking any risk characterized the latifundio and
demonstrated the colonial facet of easy money. The latifundio also channeled colonial logics of
centralism. Latifundios accounted for large portions of Latin American countries’ revenue, and,
to the benefit of the few elite and the detriment of the majority middle- and lower-class,
governments continued to support the expansion of the latifundio system Exploitation under the
latifundios was evident. “[G]rowing debt peonage trapped future generations in a vicious cycle
of grueling work and inheritable indebtedness. Few indigent peasants could escape unending
exploitation.”89 The latifundio structure “stifled” “social and economic opportunities for the
majority of the rural-agricultural population.”90
The easy money and centralism facets associated with the latifundios transferred into
many Latin American governments since government leaders were often latifundistas.
Oligarchic elites “often owned the essential resources – such as mining and agriculture – that
formed the foundation of their nations’ wealth.”91 Through the economic importance of the
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latifundios in the export market, elite families accumulated wealth and solidified their political
authority. Although they revised constitutions to promote more liberal practices, particularly
open trade, oligarchic elites “embraced increased centralized authority under a strong executive,”
namely, themselves.92 Liberal-oriented policy changes served the land-owning elites’ personal
political and economic interests while worsening the conditions of the poor.93
The 1980s Debt Crisis
At the end of the independence wars, the “newly independent countries struggled to find
stability amid internal turmoil,” and “national leaders also found themselves challenged further
by a near-constant threat of military invasion.”94 By the twentieth century, however, “[l]iberal
oligarchies and positivist leaders succeeded in establishing relative political and economic
stability.”95 Industrialization movements in the United States and Europe required raw materials,
“which meant that Latin American economies could jump on the train to progress, attaining
unusually high growth in their exports, production, and wages.”96 For example, “in 1880
Argentine exports increased tenfold compared to the beginning of the century and multiplied by
50 the value of rural exports; Chile multiplied its exports by 50 during the same period.”97 The
increased international demand for Latin American resources heavily benefited the latifundistas,
who owned most of the rural land from which raw materials came. The demand also encouraged
infrastructure developments, particularly railroads, to move people and goods throughout Latin
American countries. However, having only recently begun to achieve such economic success in
the international market, governments had to front the expenses of construction with foreign
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debt. The resulting effect was that by 1913, “almost one-third of all foreign investment in Latin
America was invested in government debt.”98 Governments and investors assumed that the
railroads and other projects would increase wealth and generate enough profits to pay off the
debts. These assumptions proved to be incorrect, as “[h]indsight makes clear that continued
borrowing was not sustainable and that both the banks and the Latin American nations were
engaging in reckless behavior.”99
Although Latin American countries appeared to be transforming into more liberalized,
free-trade societies, the changes were only surface-level. The “foundation of the apparent
institutional transformation that occurred in the nineteenth century was weak. It was not based on
the evolution of usage, customs, and rules that protected individual liberty and restricted the
power of government…the transformation depended on constraints placed by international
trade.”100 Because “foreign investment required predictability in the legal framework,” it “acted
as a constraint on the government,” introducing more checks on the overly powerful executive
branch.101 These constraints existed in tandem with international demand for Latin American
exports, so once the United States’ and Europe’s investment in and trade with Latin America
began to decrease in the early 1900s, the levels of economic and political stability in Latin
America decreased, too. Due to the recent infrastructural improvements, Latin America’s
production of raw materials grew to meet the projected international demand, but the combined
impacts of the Great Depression (1929-1933), World War I (1914-1918), and World War II
(1939-1945), significantly diminished that demand, causing Latin American production to grow
faster than the international demand and resulting in continually dropping prices of Latin
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American exports.102 Additionally, political turmoil and violence in many Latin American
countries during the second half of the twentieth century further decimated Latin American
economies and expanded already existing black markets.103
Latin America’s colonial institutions emerged as governments once again started to
centralize power and as the World Wars spurred rises in nationalism. The nation, “a new unit
colonized by rent- and privilege-seeking interest groups who preached ideological nationalism,”
replaced the individual in politics, and “[i]n the decades that followed, the state and not the
market led the economy.”104 Latin American countries attempted to redefine themselves as social
democracies, implementing social constitutions that “placed limits on individual rights and
legalized taking of property for a public purpose.”105 Despite being well-intentioned, social
constitutionalist governments in Latin America in the 1900s channeled the facets of conversion,
easy money, centralism, and political violence of Spanish colonialism. Latin American
governments’ emphasis on nationalist ideological purity echoed the Crown’s pursuit of religious
purity, states controlled the economy, trampled on private property and individual rights, and
relied on rent-seeking strategies, especially taxes, to increase public spending, and
legitimizations of military violence were linked to narratives of state intervention.
Latin America in the 1980s was characterized by “stagnation and hyperinflation;
reductions in per capita GDP; declines in health, education, and justice; destruction of pension
systems; complete absence of public investment (and its consequences on the quality of
services); corruption; and ruin of state-owned corporations.”106 In its 1986 Annual Report, the
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World Bank reported: “The current situation in most Latin American countries is one of
negligible per capita income growth, depressed per capita consumption levels, low investment, a
high savings drain for external-interest payments, net resource transfers from the private to the
public sector to help finance debt-service payments (for most of which the public sector is
responsible), and, in many countries, high inflation.”107 Latin America’s foreign debt was so high
that in 1985, “[i]nterest payments abroad were equal to about 38 percent of the region’s exports
of goods; such percentages were especially high for Argentina (66 percent), Chile (45 percent),
and Bolivia (34 percent).”108 By 1990, Latin America’s overall inflation was 18 percent.109 As
Yeatts writes, “It is no wonder that the 1980s are known throughout Latin America as ‘the lost
decade.’”110 Burkholder et al. explain how Latin America’s economy reached such a low point:
Governments accustomed to enormous budget deficits throughout the 1970s had relied on
loans to cover the shortfall between expenditures and income. As access to additional
capital disappeared, they tried to offset their deficits by increasing the money supply, a
fiscal expedient that produced rampant hyperinflation throughout the 1980s…As
consumer prices rose virtually overnight, the purchasing power of the population dropped
substantially.111
Recovery efforts during the debt crisis included the involvement of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), which encouraged cuts in public spending. Furthermore, the IMF’s emphasis on
decreased state spending caused a “wave of privatizations…As a result, a new opening to the
global market replaced the economic nationalism that had characterized Latin American trade
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and commerce…Many critics have argued that the consequence was to expose these nations to
new systems of exploitation.”112
Latin America’s Inability to Escape Colonial Logics
A common theme throughout the shared impacts of Spanish colonialism is the inability of
Latin American countries to prevent regressions into social, political, and economic situations
that resemble the exploitative nature of their colonial experience. This observation is important
because it demonstrates how intrinsic colonial logics and practices are in most aspects of Latin
American society. During the colonial period in Latin America, power systems were deliberately
structured to further the interests of those already in power, and cycles of the state centralizing
power through exploitation and coercion became built into Latin American institutions. Change
would have to occur on a systemic level, rewriting both formal and informal rules and
institutions. Latin American countries’ failed attempts at implementing constitutions mirroring
the decentralized government and liberal principles of the neighboring United States’
Constitution following the independence wars of the nineteenth century show how simply
declaring new formal rules could not override “a centuries-old heritage of bureaucratic controls
and its corresponding ideology.”113 “Throughout the periods of anarchy and violence what
remained constant was the centralist structure of government in its different authoritarian
incarnations.”114 Reinventing the economic and political structures on such a deep level in order
to promote equality and disincentivize exploitation would only occur if those in power initiated it
or if the citizens carried out a successful revolution.115 The colonial facets and logics were
allowed to continue and fester until they resulted in widespread catastrophes such as Latin
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America’s “lost decade” because the only people who could make peaceful change had no
incentive to.
The Dirty Wars
The Dirty Wars in Argentina and Chile present examples of some of the most extreme
manifestations of the four colonial facets across social, political, and economic institutions.
While Argentina and Chile shared a similar general history, following the trends of most of Latin
American countries, and were neighbors, as independent countries they have their own unique
identities and histories. For example, the Andes Mountains primed Chile for mineral and
precious metals extraction under the mita variation of encomienda labor, while Argentina’s
flatter, lower-level land further inland from the sea was more dedicated to growing crops,
particularly wheat, and raising cattle.116, 117 These trends continued as Argentina and Chile
developed: the former continued its tradition in agriculture and livestock , and the latter
concentrated on manufacturing with some agricultural work on the side. Chile emerged from the
independence wars “one of Latin America’s most stable and democratic countries,” maintaining
a strong tradition of civilian rule since its independence from Spain in 1818.118 Argentina
struggled more on its way to establishing civilian rule in 1860, becoming the wealthiest country
in Latin America, but the Great Depression ended its “stable, constitutional, elite-controlled
political system” and strong economy in 1930.119 Following the trend across Latin America,
Chile’s and Argentina’s elite controlled the countries’ political systems. The beginnings of
economic decline following the Great Depression and the inspiring Cuban revolution from 1953
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to 1959 triggered revolutions in Chile and Argentina, but Chile initially chose “revolution by the
ballot box,” continuing to hold elections until 1970. 120 Argentina, however, opted for military
revolutions, “experience[ing] nine successful military coups and twenty-one different
presidential administrations” between 1930 and 1976, out of which “only two completed their
constitutional terms, none after 1952.”121 Despite the differing preconditions for the Dirty Wars
in Argentina and Chile, the colonial facets of conversion, easy money, centralism, and political
violence manifested in shockingly similar ways throughout the Dirty Wars in both countries,
revealing the continued presence of colonial logics and practices.
Chile
Increases in socioeconomic inequalities in Chile during the 1950s and 1960s, combined
with the Cuban Revolution, began the political radicalization that would eventually lead to the
country’s first military intervention since 1932. Chileans sought government reform that would
address “high rates of infant mortality, inadequate housing for the urban and rural poor, and a
power imbalance based on workers’ exploitation by the landowning elite under the system of
latifundia.”122 Salvador Allende, with the support of Chile’s Socialist, Communist, and four
smaller non-Marxist parties, won the presidential election in 1970, becoming “the world’s first,
and only, freely elected socialist who was committed to eliminating large-scale capitalism in his
country.”123 Allende’s vigorous campaign against the business elite, who were heavily
represented in Chile’s judicial and legislative branches, led to continued blockings of Allende’s
agenda, but Allende, using the institutionalized power imbalance in favor of the executive
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branch, continued to push forward with his reforms.124 Allende’s reforms included “housing
reforms, workers’ rights, access to health care, improvements to the nation’s legal system, and a
system of milk distribution to combat infant mortality.”125 Chile became increasingly polarized
along historic lines between workers and landowners, and “[h]ypermobilization in both the
countryside and the large cities brought peasants and workers face to face with landowners and
bosses in ways that were inconceivable to either side just a few years earlier.”126
The 1973 military coup came as no surprise to most of Chile:
Chile was virtually bankrupt, beset by shortages and runaway inflation, and increasingly
ungovernable…Weary of daily confrontation and permanent crisis, many ordinary
Chileans welcomed military intervention, with the expectation that the armed forces
would follow a conventional Latin American script: seize control, detain and deport top
government officials, hold power for a year of two, and then call elections to restore
civilian rule.127
A military victory was traditionally one of the main methods of reestablishing political stability
and appeared to be the only option at this point; the other two options, a gradual return to
stability or peaceful negotiations between the two sides, no longer seemed viable.128 Allende
committed suicide after refusing to surrender to the military, which faced no resistance as it took
control of the country. Despite having won virtually complete control of Chile, “for several
weeks a brutal crackdown filled makeshift jails, hospitals, and morgues.”129 The military
established military war tribunals, under which about 300 leftist supporters were executed
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immediately.130 In the first year of the junta’s rule, an estimated 150,000 people were arrested,
almost two percent of Chile’s population.131 General Augusto C. Pinochet served as the leader of
Chile’s military dictatorship, which lasted until 1990 following a massive election in 1988 in
which Chileans overwhelming signaled their lack of support for Pinochet.132
In the weeks following the coup, the military junta dismantled any Chilean institutions
that could challenge it. “It replaced UP [Unidad Popular] provincial governors with military
officers, removed all mayors and city councilors, banned left parties and suspended the others,
and closed Congress.”133 The junta placed Chile under strict censorship, dissolved the national
labor federation, stationed military personnel as directors at universities, and burned the election
registries.134 These tactics enabled the junta to quickly centralize power, and its publicly violent
tactics additionally suppressed any challenges to its absolute rule. In an October speech, Pinochet
legitimized the junta’s violence as “God’s work, and he committed himself to the ‘heroic
struggle’ to carry out a ‘moral cleansing’ in order to ‘extirpate the root of evil from Chile.’”135
This narrative likens the Chilean military’s mission of destroying leftist ideologies and replacing
them with one ideology – its own – to the Spanish Crown’s conversion agenda during
colonialism, an agenda that the Crown similarly justified by claiming it, too, was pursuing a
divine agenda. Tensions between the poor and the rich had existed since Chile’s very beginning
and throughout its history, as workers were exploited from the encomienda system into the
latifundios and were denied a political voice as a result of Chile’s elite-centered political
structure. Allende had provided the first real attempt at changing the systemic, colonialism-
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rooted inequalities in Chile, but the tradition of a centralist government favoring the few
prevailed. The military junta, following colonial traditions of alliances between those holding
political power and the wealthy elite, strayed from conflict with the elite, and many middle- and
upper-class Chileans continued on unaware of junta’s violent measures for the first few
months.136 Chile’s Dirty War erupted along colonial divisions and demonstrated the
pervasiveness of colonial logics and practices within Chile’s seemingly democratically
progressing society.
Argentina
Army colonel Juan D. Perón was elected president of Argentina in 1946 and again in
1951. Under his governance, wealth was redistributed more favorably towards the work force,
gaining him the support of the working class but alienating the economic and social elites.
Perón’s government’s prolabor policies went against Argentina’s colonial roots of privilegeseeking economics and state-elite collaboration, and when his term ended in 1955, Perón left
Argentina as “a country so deeply and bitterly divided that it was essentially ungovernable
except by force.”137 Radicalized groups increased, and workers suffered under anti-labor policies
that served as backlash to Perón’s socialist reforms. “Between 1955 and Perón’s return to the
presidency in 1973, Argentina alternated between civilian and military governments that
averaged less than twenty-two months in duration.”138 While Perón remained exiled in Madrid,
“government control alternated between civilian Peronist activists and military leaders.”139
Economic instability accompanied the frequent leadership changes in the Argentine government,
and political violence plagued the country. Civilian guerrilla groups robbed banks, kidnapped
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officials for ransom, attacked police, military posts, and elites, and assassinated military and
government figures.140 The presence of guerrilla groups only strengthened the government’s
incentives to kill civilians. Since guerrilla groups can be hard to target and defeat through
tradition military measures, “counterinsurgent forces often choose to target the guerrillas’ base of
support in the population. This kind of counterinsurgency strategy can lead to the intentional
killing of massive numbers of civilians.”141 The government responded with violence, “us[ing]
torture, executions, and disappearance to counter the surging leftist mobilization.”142 Perón
returned to Argentina to be reelected president in 1973, but his return to power only divided the
country further. Perón died a year later, leaving his wife and vice president, Isabel, in charge of
Argentina.
Isabel left all main decision to her advisor, José López Rega, who had founded and
controlled the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA), “an extraofficial death squad made up
largely of military and police.”143 Under Rega, the AAA countered leftist terrorism between
1974 and 1976 by murdering intellectuals, journalists, union leaders, and students aligned with
the left, sometimes at rates of more than a hundred per month.144 The intense radicalization and
division fed off of unresolved colonial tensions between the politically and economically
powerful, and the laborers and intellectuals, who were historically repressed by elite-centered
governments who furthered their own agendas and sidelined the working the majority. The
situation was unsustainable, and “a majority of Argentines welcomed the coup of March 24,
1976, believing that a military government was necessary to restore order and reverse the
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economic decline.”145 Military intervention was institutionalized into Argentina’s history, and
political violence, while a key piece in maintaining colonial logics of inequality and exploitation,
had also proved during the independence wars to be one of the only ways to overthrow
repressive regimes. As in Chile, civilians expected that the military intervention would follow a
similar cycle as it had before – the military would take control of the government for a couple of
years while it restored the political system and reinstated elections. However, “it soon became
clear that this regime was different from previous ones.”146 Beginning with the 1976 coup,
Argentina’s Dirty War lasted until 1983, when Argentina returned to civilian rule following the
military’s defeat by Britain in Falkland Islands and growing international animosity towards the
regime.147
Jorge Videla, representing the joint venture of the army, navy, and air force commanders
behind the coup, headed the military dictatorship. Unlike in Chile, the military did not impose a
curfew and did not advertise its agenda of rooting out leftists. Instead, it pursued a less
documented campaign characterized by untracked disappearances, perhaps in response to “the
international outcry against human rights violations in Chile” during Chile’s Dirty War.148
Videla’s dictatorship was reminiscent of Argentina’s colonial history. Argentina’s military
dictatorship pursued a complete purge of Argentine society, enforcing strict censorship and
instilling terror throughout the country as it abducted, tortured, and killed suspected leftist
supporters. Until the regime’s collapse in 1983, the military and police murdered an estimated
3,800 leftists.149 The regime disappeared an additional 8,960 people, of whom the regime kept no
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arrest records nor whose bodies were found.150 Torture was common, too, and the Argentine
military and police forces ran approximately 380 secret detention centers.151 The centers
practices psychological and physical torture, and medical doctors often supervised sessions.152
Utilizing medical references such as “diagnosis,” “cancer,” “social pathology,”
“surgery,” and “extirpation of diseased tissues,” the militarized Argentine state channeled logics
of ideological purity and homogeneity, concepts that were fundamental in the Spanish Crown’s
conversion campaign in Spanish America.153 The state justified its violent and militarized
campaign against leftist supporters through the idea that leftist ideologies were a danger to the
state’s security and by spreading the narrative that only by eradicating such ideologies, through
whatever means necessary, could the Argentine state be preserved. Videla placed no restraints on
the military’s power, assigning to the military a purpose that surpassed moral boundaries,
echoing the divine right granted to the military by the Spanish Crown during the Reconquista
and conquest of Latin America.154 Additionally, many of the lines between the leftist ‘terrorists’
and the rightist dictatorship, including its elite and military supporters, were built on centuriesold tensions stemming from how the Argentine institutions systemically marginalized and
exploited the working class while perpetuating the centralized political and social power of the
elites, whose wealth accumulated centered on colonial easy money, rent-seeking strategies. The
state terrorism of the Dirty War in Argentina was deliberately designed by the dictatorship to
cement and centralize allied elite and military while discouraging the formation of a cohesive
opposition, just as the Spanish Crown’s deliberate choice of labor institutions and colonial
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government structures served its desire to maintain its absolute authority over Spanish America.
Disappearances by the Argentine military and police especially served the dictatorship’s purpose
of ironclad control, since uncertainty of victims’ fates perpetuated feelings of fear and
powerlessness among victims’ friends and families.155 Political violence characterized both
Argentina’s military dictatorship’s and colonial Spain’s preservation of power, and narratives of
protecting state security and the endowment of a higher purpose legitimized the states’ use of
violence against resistive civilians.
Facets of Spanish Colonialism in the Dirty Wars
In the Dirty Wars, the facets of Spanish colonialism manifested in the states’
legitimizations of political violence, deliberate, violent, and illiberal methods of centralizing state
rule, initial civilian faith in the military, and disproportionate adverse effects to the peasants and
workers. Logics of purity and uniformity associated with conversion translated into narratives of
ideological purity as a means of maintaining state security, and the military and political violence
served a higher purpose, perhaps even one ordained by God. The exploitation and inequality
perpetuated by easy money strategies, particularly in the evolution of the encomienda into the
latifundia and by the consistent domination of politics by the elite, created a key point of division
in Argentina and Chile. Both countries attempted to break from the cycle of elite-controlled
political systems, yet reformist attempts “ran against the cold reality of the administrative, legal,
and cultural heritage of the colony,” and the military quickly quelled these threats to tradition.156
Following the Crown’s example of centralized absolute authority, Chile’s and Argentina’s
military dictatorships removed obstacles to their power and implemented tactics, especially
violent ones, designed to spread fear and discourage resistance. As with colonialism, the few and

155
156

Wright, State Terrorism in Latin America, 108.
Yeatts, The Roots of Poverty in Latin America, 70.

52
the elite suffered the least, while conditions worsened for the peasants and laborers. The military
coups showed how the colonial relationship between military success and political and economic
rewards persisted over centuries into the twentieth century. Despite differences in their political
and economic scenes, Argentina and Chile share their Spanish colonial roots, and tracing the
facets of Spanish colonialism to their expression in the notorious Dirty Wars helps demonstrate
how fundamental Spanish colonialism remains in the informal and formal institutions of Latin
America.
Conclusion
Spanish colonialism in Latin America left a lasting impact on Latin American countries
visible in their political, social, and economic logics and institutions. Recently victorious in an
800-year war against the Muslims, Catholic Spain colonized Latin America in search of riches
and to spread Christianity, two initiatives that it believed would strengthen and expand the
Spanish Empire. Four facets characterized Spanish colonialism – conversion, centralism, easy
money, and political violence. The facets intersected with each other to found Latin America on
concepts of inequality and exploitation, and, from their beginnings, Latin American institutions
were deliberately designed to further the power and wealth of the already powerful and wealthy.
The depth to which the facets of Spanish colonialism are embedded in Latin America countries is
evident in the countries’ shared inability to escape colonial power structures and cycles of
exploitation and inequality. Latin American countries’ independence wars, the development of
the latifundia from the colonial encomienda system, and Latin America’s debt crisis in the 1980s
provide a generalized overview of some of the key manifestations of colonial facets. By looking
at the Dirty Wars in Argentina and Chile, one can see more specific paths from colonial logics
and institutions to more current outbreaks of political violence, campaigns for ideological purity,

53
state inability and unwillingness to decentralize power, and economic conditions that hold down
laborers.
To better understand why colonial practices and logics persist despite reforms and
development in Latin American countries, I propose two routes for future research. First, looking
at the role of individual and national identity in state politics could help explain ongoing identity
issues in Latin American countries stemming from their contested state formation. As Slater
points out, “the politics of identity and difference are located in the controversies of origin and
discovery.”157 A connection between the absence of a shared national identity, stemming from
controversial roots of state formation in colonialism, may impact the occurrences of military
coups as opposed to elections as a means of changing governments in Latin American
countries.158 Second, researching the impact of outside countries’ perceptions of and
relationships with Latin America could shed additional light on why Latin American countries
continue to experience logics and practices that bear resemblance to those of the colonial period.
I suspect that some further-developed countries’ perceptions of Latin America as a third-world
country contribute to international relations that continually place Latin America in the situation
of the colonized. In other words, external intervention, particularly by the United States, in Latin
American politics and international exploitation of Latin America’s resources serve as
mechanisms of maintaining Latin America’s subordinate position to more powerful countries
which benefit from narratives supporting the need for more developed countries to help
modernize and develop Latin America. This logic is fundamentally colonial, and connections can
be drawn between colonial forms of control and exploitation and contemporary relations between
developed and ‘third-world’ countries.
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Exploring the origins of a Latin America is important in understanding the values and
traditions on which its institutions were built. This helps explain why some institutions fail to
protect their citizens from abuse perpetrated by the state or why a democratic constitution
governs the United States while attempts at decentralization in Latin American countries failed.
The persistence of economic and political instability inherited from Latin America’s colonial
experience identifies how systemic reform, rather than surface-level amendments, that addresses
patterns of exploitation and inequality across Latin American institutions needs to occur in order
to affect lasting change. For example, the occurrence of military coups in Latin America have
been linked to poverty.159 This observation in light of speculations that the 2010s may represent
another ‘lost decade’ for Latin America should serve as an indicator that persistent colonial
logics and practices that perpetuate the existence of poverty, slow economic growth, and political
turmoil in Latin America need to be taken seriously and addressed on a deep enough level in
order to break the cycles and prevent reiterations of the Dirty Wars. Protests, political unrest, and
authoritarian-styled regimes are already on the rise in Latin America. In Nicaragua, for instance,
President Ortega continues to consolidate power among his family while exercising strict
censorship and persecuting leftist supporters and intellectuals.160 Venezuela, too, is in the midst
of a political and economic crisis.161 It is vital to understand how historical roots continue to
affect the ways in which countries structure their political systems, design social hierarchies, and
formulate economic policies. My research helps to show that the less obvious, informal logics in
a country can sometimes be more influential than the formal rules governing that country in
determining a country’s future trajectory and in predicting how it will respond to social, political,
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and economic challenges, indicating that special attention to a country’s origin and development
can provide a more comprehensive understanding of that country’s current situation.
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